In recent years, several countries have carried out large-scale technology foresight exercises. While these have been extensively discussed in the literature, less attention has been given to how foresight objectives are served through consultative processes which are not necessarily designated as 'foresight' but nevertheless seek to provide direction to publicly supported research and technology development (RTD) efforts. Here, we address this question by examining Finnish RTD programs in electronics and telecommunications where foresight processes have been enacted to build up capabilities for strategic flexibility and, more specifically, for the ability to change the direction of RTD efforts during the program. We also argue that these processes may be crucial in conditions of rapid technological change.
Introduction
Technology foresight has become increasingly popular, as several industrialised countries have conducted national exercises in an attempt to systematically "… look into the longer-term future of science, technology, the economy and science, with the aim of identify the areas of strategic research and emerging technologies that are likely to yield the greatest economic and social benefits." [1] In part, this proliferation of foresight activities can be attributed to the drivers which have influenced S&T policies, most notably increasing pressures on public RTD budgets and the close relationship between industrial competitiveness and technological research [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . In this setting, technology foresight has served as a catalyst for a constructive dialogue which has contributed to the attainment of the five 'Cs' identified by Martin and Irvine [14] , i.e.:
1 concentration on the longer term 2 improved coordination between the stakeholders' visions, intentions and actions 3 consensus on research areas that seem particularly promising 4 more intensive communication 5 commitment to the implementation of RTD policies [1] see also [14, 15] .
It is worth noting that many large-scale foresight exercises have enjoyed considerable independence and autonomy. In Austria, France, Italy, Germany and the USA, for example, foresight processes have been managed by organisations which have not had vested interests in the policy recommendations (see [16, 10, [17] [18] [19] [20] ). Together with sufficient endorsement by public authorities, this has strengthened the legitimacy and credibility of foresight conclusions and, as a result, helped in the formation of RTD priorities which have provided a basis for subsequent policy implementation.
Yet, several considerations suggest that the attainment of foresight objectives may benefit from foresight capacities that are built into the RTD programs themselves. The selection of projects that are aligned with foresight priorities, for example, presumes that the evaluators are fully aware of these priorities. Moreover, the monitoring of ongoing RTD work in rapidly evolving fields of technology -such as electronics and telecommunications -is likely to produce insights which may enrich or even invalidate earlier foresight conclusions. Also, to the extent that the range of competing technologies becomes increasingly complex and diversified, the funding agencies that manage RTD programs may benefit from an increasingly active collaboration with external experts in their strategic planning. Against this background, we conjecture that foresight processes that are enacted within RTD programs hold considerable promise.
A central motivation for this paper is that although large-scale foresight exercises have received much attention in the literature (see, e.g., [7, 6] , less is known of the more subtle processes through which future perspectives are brought to bear on RTD decision making in the absence of dedicated foresight exercises. An acknowledged complication in studying these processes is that they are not necessarily identified by the 'foresight' label. Indeed, Grupp and Linstone [21] note that "… individual states have different perceptions of what is entailed in identifying future growth areas of technology and in providing opportunities for strategic dialogue to encourage informal panels to exchange ideas. One serious problem is the acquisition of information from such technology foresight."
It is against this lack of knowledge about embedded foresight processes that we examine national RTD programs in Finland. We first describe Finnish RTD programs in electronics and telecommunications in the light of the mid-term evaluation of these programs. Second, we apply the viable system model from organisational cybernetics as a framework to consider how the foresight capacity has been built into these programs. We then examine issues in the implementation of embedded foresight which -for the purposes of the present paper -refers to the individual and collaborative processes through which prospective information about relevant technological, commercial and societal developments is acquired, produced, refined or communicated within RTD programs, in order to generate shared understandings in support of RTD activities.
We conjecture that embedded foresight is particularly crucial in connection with rapid technological advances and incremental innovation processes. In electronics and telecommunications, for example, the competitive environment evolves with competing de facto standards and shifting strategic alliances, whereby predictability is undermined by the emergence of new sub-industries (e.g., internet service providers), confluence of technological domains (e.g., communication and computing), as well as changes in value chains and established rules of competition (e.g., in distribution of digital music). Thus, in comparison with many other fields of technology -such as energy -the relevant planning horizons are shorter, making it all the more important that the RTD programs are vested with the capacity to question alternative development paths.
Several considerations suggest that the Finnish RTD programs in electronics and telecommunications are relevant to the organisation of publicly funded RTD activities elsewhere as well. First, Finland is at the forefront in the development of advanced telecommunications solutions and wireless applications, the adoption of which is facilitated by low tariffs and one of the world's highest penetration rate of mobile phones. Second, because the programs are national, the participants have been able to exert more influence on their priorities and modus operandi than on the framework programs of the European Union, for instance: hence, national programs are likely to reflect better the particular demands that innovation processes in electronics and telecommunications place on the organisation of such programs. Third, the Finnish innovation system has received high rankings in international comparisons: in the IMD World Competitiveness Report, for instance, company-university cooperation [22] has been considered exemplary as a result of how researchers and industrialists identify and pursue collaborative opportunities. Fourth, in terms of their very scope, the national RTD programs provide an extensive information base from which conclusions can be inferred.
Our analysis of these programs suggests that there are considerable synergies between the three intelligence tools that serve to inform policy decisions, i.e., technology foresight, technology assessment, and RTD program evaluation. Drawing upon several definitions that have been presented, program evaluation is here understood as a systematic process which seeks to determine the relevance, efficiency and effect of the program in terms of its objectives, implementation and administrative management [23] . Technology assessment, on the other hand, encompasses activities which analyse and evaluate the anticipated impacts of a given technology, examine areas of potential social conflict caused by its deployment, promote a constructive dialogue between the stakeholders, and produce recommendations for improving the technology and the terms of its application [24] . As for the term technology foresight, we adhere to Martin and Irvine's [14] definition given at the very beginning of this paper.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the technology programs of the National Technology Agency which, in part, have contributed to the growth of the Finnish electronics and telecommunications industry. Section 3 examines how embedded foresight has been implemented in the national RTD programs on electronics and telecommunications. Section 4 discusses implications for technology policy, and Section 5 addresses limitations of embedded foresight.
Electronics and telecommunications in Finnish technology policy

Tekes' technology programs
The National Technology Agency (Tekes) [25] was established in 1983 as a result of a major reform of Finnish technology policy. Ever since its creation, the mission of Tekes has been to promote technological competitiveness as a means of contributing to economic progress and societal wellbeing. To this end, Tekes provides loan guarantees for industrial RTD and sponsors technical research at universities, research institutes and companies. In 1999, Tekes funding appropriations were US$ 399 million, i.e., 32% of all public RTD funding in Finland.
Tekes' technology programs are the key policy instrument for promoting applied technological research. In 1999, about half of Tekes funding was channelled through technology programs while the other half was allocated to projects outside technology programs. Depending on the project, Tekes funds about 30-90% of total costs, whereby those projects which emphasise basic research in the continuum of activities ranging from basic research to product development receive a higher share of public support.
From the foresight perspective, it is instructive to note how the relationships between companies, research institutes and universities have evolved. The early programs, such as the Semiconductor Technology Programme 1982 Programme -1986 , consisted mostly of projects managed by universities or research institutes. Enterprises, and larger companies in particular, were also involved, but their role was often limited to the establishment of program objectives, participation in steering group work and the monitoring of ongoing projects. However, in keeping with evaluation recommendations [26] The preparation for these programs took place shortly after the Government had decided to increase public RTD appropriations in late 1996. At this time, the electronics and telecommunication sector was about to become the largest export industry and companies had reported difficulties in recruiting personnel to meet their increasing demand for a skilled workforce. As many of the projects in the earlier RTD programs had involved graduate students exploring emerging technologies, thus acquiring competencies and skills not readily available elsewhere, programs of considerable size were seen as a partial solution to the problem of training more MSc and PhD level students. Tekes consequently devoted a sizable share of its increased funding appropriations to these programs, which is one of the reasons why they became the two largest RTD programs in Finland so far. In January 2000, the funding volume of these programs was about US$ 240 million, of which the share of public support was US$ 90 million. Both programs contained more than 120 projects, of which some 55% were industrial projects and 45% were research projects.
Electronics and telecommunications industry in Finland
The above programs need to be seen in relation to the recent growth of the electronics and telecommunications industry which has catalysed a major transformation of the Finnish economy. Between 1988 and 1998, the production of electrical and electronics products grew fivefold, reaching US$ 15.9 billion [27] in 1998. During the same period, the share of high-technology exports increased from less than 5% to almost 20% of all exports. In 1999, the electronics and telecommunication industry accounted for nearly 80% of high-technology exports.
To a significant extent, this growth can be attributed to a single company, Nokia, which at the beginning of the 1990s was a diversified conglomerate with businesses in industries ranging from paper to chemicals and rubber. After a crisis in the early 1990s, Nokia chose to focus on telecommunications and has subsequently maintained high growth and profitability. At the beginning of 2000, Nokia was the world's largest manufacturer of mobiles phones and the biggest company in Europe in terms of its market capitalisation.
Due to the complexities of the technological and competitive environment, it is hard to isolate factors to which the growth of the Finnish electronics and telecommunications industry could be fully attributed. Nokia's decision to focus on telecommunications at the time when the Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) was about to become an influential standard was decisive. But this decision, too, needs to be seen against the competencies which were acquired through the development of the Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) system in the 1980s. The early deregulation of Finnish telecommunications policy in 1987, too, has also contributed to the development of the industry [28] .
From the policy perspective, the rapid growth of high-technology exports has made it easier to justify increases in public RTD spending. In particular, the Finnish Government decided in late 1996 to increase public RTD appropriations by US$ 83.2 million per annum over a three-year period. At the same time, it encouraged companies to match this investment so that: 1 2.9% of national GNP would be spent on RTD in 1999 2 60% of this RTD expenditure would be funded by industry [29] .
Due to the growth of the electronics and telecommunications industry, both of these goals were surpassed as the total RTD expenditure reached 3.1% of GNP (US$ 3.7 billion) in 1999 while the share of industrial funding was close to 70% of total RTD expenditure. More than half of industrial RTD was carried out by the electrical and electronics industry, while Nokia's global RTD expenditure (US$ 1.74 billion) was greater than the total amount of public RTD funding in Finland (US$ 1.13 billion).
Mid-term evaluation methodology
Our discussion of embedded foresight builds on the mid-term evaluation of the above RTD programs [30] . In this evaluation, we drew on several complementary sources of information:
1 Interviews were conducted with the program coordination, program management, project managers as well as influential technologists in industry and public administration [31] . More than 50 semi-structured interviews were carried out.
2 The 18 largest research projects in the two programs were subjected to an international peer review in which the projects were rated with regard to criteria such as technological novelty, commercial significance, and strength of the consortium [32].
3 The programs were discussed with three eminent Japanese industrialists on the Tekes' Advisory Board in Tokyo [33] . The members of this board had considerable expertise in international business and technology management.
4 A questionnaire survey was sent out to all the participating projects. The questionnaire design was influenced by the interviews and the remarks of the Japanese Advisory Board. Specifically, there were questions on:
i the participants' expectations and experiences vis-à-vis the funding agency ii the importance of different objectives at the project level and the program level iii experiences with regard to the attainment of these objectives iv perceived bottlenecks in the innovation system.
It is worth noting that Tekes asked us to produce a prospective evaluation which would consider the extent to which RTD efforts are aligned with technological and commercial opportunities as perceived by the program participants. While the size of the RTD programs and shortcomings in their internal communication structures limited our possibilities of fully exploring this issue within the available time-frame, the remit can nevertheless be seen as a signal that Tekes recognises the need for an increasingly prospective approach in its evaluations.
Implementation of embedded foresight
Management structure
The evolution of program structures from university -and industry -led models towards the solutions adopted in the ETX and TLX programs was largely driven by a search for a balance between technology-push and demand-pull policies. An essential part of this was the creation of complementary relationships between the formal management structures and the informal personal networks which helped program participants to acquire information and to discuss alternative technological development paths. Both types of relationships have promoted systemic coordination in the innovation system [34] . The foresight capacity was integrated into the RTD programs by adopting the following management structure:
The ETX program manager noted that the ETX program should be viewed as an autonomous organisation which is capable of monitoring its environment and able to adjust itself in response to earlier experiences and perceived challenges. There are several arguments which suggest that this viewpoint is a fruitful one.
To begin with, in some areas of electronics and telecommunication -such as the development of value added services -the rapid pace of technological change implies that it is inappropriate to cling on to a fixed set of research priorities for several years. For instance, only a few years ago considerable hopes were attached to ATM switches, but now much of this interest has waned due to advances in competing technologies. Thus, there is a need for strategic flexibility which refers to the ability to change the direction of RTD efforts during the program. In practice, the implementation of strategic flexbility is likely to call for the termination of unfruitful development paths and the initiation of new RTD activities which are deemed to hold considerable potential.
From the viewpoint of effectiveness and accountability, it appears that the decisions associated with the implementation of strategic flexibility (e.g., determination of and adjustments to research priorities) are best taken within the RTD program, particularly in those settings where it is difficult to determine a priori what the most promising technological means are to enhance technological competitiveness [35, 36] . This kind of empowerment of RTD programs is likely to be advantageous from the viewpoint of responsiveness as well: for example, the range of evaluation recommendations that can be accounted for by RTD program management is larger than in settings where the design and working practices of the program are dictated by external requirements (see, e.g., [37] ).
For the purpose of examining the two RTD programs, we employ the viable system model from Beer's [38] organisational cybernetics as a framework of analysis (see Table 1 ). This model is based on five managerial functions -policy, intelligence, coordination, control and operations -which seek to ensure that the organisation is capable of evolving so as to achieve its objectives. In the two technology programs, the key tasks associated with these managerial functions were the following (see Table 1 ): Table 1 Managerial functions in the RTD programs
While the different levels in the management structure contributed to several of these functions, there was nevertheless a rather clear separation of responsibilities. Specifically, the boxes with a grey background in Table 1 indicate how the managerial functions were served by the different decision making units. Thus, for instance, the program steering groups defined policies for what kinds of projects would best comply with the program objectives. On the other hand, many operative procedures -such as the requirements for administrative reporting -were defined by Tekes' standard practices. The expert panels were crucial for implementing the intelligence function which contributed to awareness-raising and provided information in support of RTD decision making. In collaboration with Tekes' staff, these panels invited leading experts from industry and the research community to workshops to identify opportunities on which concerted research efforts would be called for. Every year, each expert panel would typically organise two or three large workshops which were attended by some 50 participants. These consultations and discussions within expert panels supported the preparation of Calls for Proposals and guided the initiation of new RTD activities.
The coordination function focused on the collection and sharing of information about the RTD program and related activities in support of the four other managerial functions. By appointment, the coordinator was the most visible representative of this activity, because it was his responsibility to disseminate information about the program, to monitor ongoing RTD efforts, and to identify synergies between projects. But many others -the expert panels, in particular -also contributed to the coordination activities.
The operations of the technology program consisted of the actual RTD efforts, its raison d'être. In keeping with its earlier practices, Tekes retained full authority for the approval of new projects and ensured full confidentiality of this process. Thus, even though the expert panels produced vision statements and commented on research topics that should be pursued by Finnish innovators, they did not take part in the ex ante evaluation of project proposals. However, it was suggested that possibilities of leveraging their expertise to the evaluation of proposed research projects should be pursued.
In the framework of Table 1 , control can be viewed as the ability to take and endorse decisions in conjunction with the other managerial functions, i.e., policy (i.e., strategic objectives, program policies), intelligence (i.e., assessment of technologies), and operations (i.e., execution of projects), whereby coordination contributes to effective information acquisition and dissemination. In the two RTD programs, control was exercised primarily by three types of decision making units, i.e., program steering group (e.g., program level policies), the funding agency (e.g., approval and rejection of project proposals), and project steering groups (e.g., management of individual projects). However, we emphasise that Tekes had representatives in all the steering groups (i.e. program SGs, theme area SGs and project SGs) so that its experts permeated all the managerial functions at the different levels of decision making.
As shown in Table 1 , the managerial functions for policy and control were directly linked to corresponding decision making units (e.g., program steering groups, project steering groups), while the managerial functions for intelligence and coordination were not assigned to similar decision making units. Thus, while the control mechanisms for policies and operations were rather well in place, those associated with intelligence were weaker, partly because the expert panels were not in a position to endorse their views. This important observation -which we return to in Section 4 -has consequences for the implementation of the intelligence function.
To some extent, the separation of managerial functions in Table 1 is misleading because many senior persons held several positions. In the telecommunications program, for instance, the coordinator was a member of the program steering group on which the leaders of the expert panels were also represented, and many panel members had ongoing projects in the program. These complementary responsibilities contributed to information sharing and lent coherence to the program management. However, projects which had no personal contacts to the program management did not benefit from the discussions which took place at the program and theme area levels to the same extent.
In analysing the RTD programs, we have found the framework in Table 1 useful as a tool for clarifying relationships between the different managerial functions and associated responsibilities. It can be used for other purposes as well, such as for the development of systematic approaches to the evaluation of different managerial functions. Table 2 lists the instruments which were employed in the two RTD programs to support the managerial function for intelligence. These instruments were designed to promote intermediate objectives such as awareness-raising, networking, and priority-setting, whereby some instruments (e.g., workshops) served several objectives. As much of the foresight work depended on the expert panels, we briefly report experiences from expert panel activity.
Implementation of embedded foresight
Most panelists reported that the development of vision statements had been a useful exercise, because it forced them to devote considerable thought to what advances might offer promising opportunities to innovators. Some of them also noted that the exercise had required much more time and effort than they had initially envisaged. Since many of the panel members already knew each other (i.e., each panel was assembled by its appointed leader), this suggests that the production of informative visions is not an easy task [39, 40] .
The expert panels did not receive methodological support or external guidance for their foresight work. A benefit of this was that there were no prior constraints on what topics the panels should consider or how these topics should be explicated. An associated drawback, however, was that the vision statements were rather briefly stated (i.e., no more than two or three pages), and sometimes they lacked information on key dimensions (e.g., degree of uncertainty) or failed to explicate underlying assumptions (e.g., growth rates). Thus, although the foresight work created shared understandings among the panelists, the lack of methodological rigour reduced possibilities for codifying the results into a format which might have supported their more direct uses in RTD decision making.
There were significant differences in the intensity of expert panel activity. Most panels were active and convened regularly (i.e., every other month or so) to work on their vision statements and to prepare seminars and workshops. A few others, on the other hand, were not convinced of the utility of producing vision statements, because their leaders felt that such statements would be expressed at such a high a level of abstraction that they would not be all that informative to the program participants. Overall, the disposition of the leader was critical: panels with an enthusiastic and committed leader were invariably more active than those in which the leader remained apprehensive about foresight. Table 2 Instruments of embedded foresight Almost all expert panels expressed some dissatisfaction with the fact that they were not empowered to provide feedback on the submitted project proposals. To some extent, the foresight work added to this dissatisfaction, because it made the panelists more committed to the RTD program and therefore more eager to share their views on what kinds of projects would best contribute to the program objectives. Also, the projects were not always aware of the theme area with which they had been associated, which was a further indication of the relatively weak link between projects and the panels. In the framework of Table 1 , these observations indicate that the control procedures associated with the managerial function for intelligence -which was being instituted for the first time in this way -were weaker and more experimental than those for policy and operations. The seminars and workshops organised by the expert panels in the two programs were widely appreciated. They helped establish brand names which were widely recognised and made it easier to draw attention to further program initiatives. In this regard, the program's large size was helpful in promoting networking and collaboration.
A framework for foresight processes
For a further analysis of the implementation of embedded foresight, it is instructive to examine the above foresight instruments in the framework of Table 3 . Here, the vertical axis is defined by awareness-raising and priority-setting, i.e., the two objectives which have been central in many exercises:
• Awareness-raising refers to purposeful efforts to improve the stakeholders' (including program management and potential program participants) knowledge about relevant technological, commercial and societal developments; current and planned policy measures; and each others' interests and competencies.
• Priority-setting refers to the processes through which such knowledge or parts thereof is translated into priorities for subsequent RTD resource allocations. Such priorities may differ in terms of their focus (tight vs. loose), stakeholder involvement (few experts vs. consultation of all stakeholders), and openness of communication (confidential vs. publicly announced).
The horizontal axis, on the other hand, is concerned with the extent to which the foresight processes and their outputs are explicitly defined and codified or, conversely, the extent to which these processes remain implicit in terms of their execution and utilisation (e.g., ad hoc consultations). While the framework in Table 3 can be extended by including further distinctions, the 2 x 2 matrix is sufficient for present purposes. The four quadrants defined by these axes correspond to specific contexts in which foresight processes may take place. In the first quadrant, for instance, prospective thinking is stimulated through informal consultations, the outcomes of which are not codified in precise terms. In the second quadrant, the need to produce codified outputs is likely to call for the application of methods such as Delphi. The third quadrant, in turn, is focused on the definition of explicit RTD priorities. In the fourth quadrant, the research priorities remain implicit, whereby subjective perceptions are likely to influence RTD decisions considerably. Table 3 A framework for foresight processes
The framework in Table 3 is helpful in that alternative foresight processes can be viewed as combinations of or transitions between these four quadrants. For example, the deployment of methodological support to otherwise unstructured consultations corresponds to a move from the first quadrant to the second. The preparation of lists of critical technologies can be regarded as a process which leads from the first quadrant to the third (see, e.g., [17] ). Also, funding agencies may also promote informal consultations in the first quadrant and use these as a backdrop for their own RTD decision making in quadrant four. They may also be lobbied by organisations which seek to promote their interests. Several other processes are also suggested by Table 3 . The process of assimilating codified outputs from foresight exercises can be viewed as a transition from the second quadrant to the first, whereby informal discussions help ensure that the results are fully acknowledged. The move from the second quadrant to the third corresponds to a strategic analysis in which the results of forecasting-oriented analyses are mapped onto corresponding research priorities. In moving from the second quadrant to the fourth, the RTD decision makers form their subjective research priorities on the basis of the prospective analyses that are presented to them.
Because the explication of RTD priorities calls for considerable involvement and thought, it is likely to influence the decision makers' perception of research opportunities; this suggests a strong link from quadrant three to quadrant four. Links from priority-setting to awareness-raising are also possible: for instance, the priorities may be subjected to a wider awareness-oriented discussion ( ⇒ ), and those involved in the shaping of priorities may be requested to justify on what grounds these priorities were initially defined ( ⇒ ). Even in situations where no explicit foresight deliverables or priorities have been produced (i.e., quadrant four), external pressures to justify RTD decisions may provoke an ex post rationalisations of these priorities ( ⇒ ), or lead to a wider discussion of RTD policies ( ⇒ ) and the analyses on which they were based ( ⇒ ).
In the Finnish RTD program on electronics and telecommunications, the foresight instruments (see Table 2 ) can be viewed as an effort to explicate some of the processes that are characteristic of quadrants one and four. In particular, the two processes with a strong output-orientation were:
1 the creation of vision statements ( ⇒ ), and 2 the preparation of Calls for Proposals ( ⇒ ), both of which were prepared by the expert panels.
Most of the other activities (visits, seminars, workshops) can be positioned in the first quadrant, although some presentations contained explicit statements on prospective developments as well. They also influenced the funding agency's perceptions about future technological opportunities ( ⇒ ) and, furthermore, secured a wider stakeholder involvement for the two main foresight processes (vision statements, Calls for Proposals). Unless codified outputs are required, it is possible that the focus of embedded foresight remains in quadrants one and four. This is because embedded foresight benefits from the experts' overlapping contact networks, common interests and personal histories, which helps them assess the potential and feasibility of alternative paths of action without necessarily explicating the outcomes of the underlying analyses. Yet, such analyses play a vital role in the creation of shared understandings and the legitimacy of RTD decision making.
Thus, a key question in the promotion of embedded foresight in RTD programs include:
1 how extensively foresight processes should be elaborated along the route ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ , 2 how the assimilation of foresight results can be best supported through the links ⇒ and ⇒ , and 3 what dimensions of foresight can be most meaningfully enacted through the informal link ⇒ .
In seeking answers to these questions, important considerations include, among others, the relevance and usefulness of codified deliverables, the legitimacy of RTD decision making processes, the benefits of explicit foresight processes (e.g., networking, learning), as well as the amount of resources that are consumed by such processes. Our standpoint is that a strong case can be made in favour of explicating foresight processes, since this supports information sharing and may reveal issues which might not receive much attention otherwise [41, 42] . The framework in Table 3 is applicable to the analysis of comprehensive foresight exercises, too, because many of the processes listed above take place in these as well. Moreover, this framework supports the development of a systematic approach to the evaluation of foresight exercises, given that such evaluations need to address what impacts the explication of foresight processes has brought about in relation to the implicit processes in quadrants one and four.
Expectations of the intelligence function in RTD programs
Further insights into the managerial function for intelligence were obtained through a questionnaire study. In this study, the contact persons of the participating RTD projectsmost of whom were project managers -rated on a five-point Likert scale the relative importance of constructs which were used for gauging the relative importance of different objectives; these were derived from earlier program evaluations and initial interviews with program participants. The respondents were also requested to indicate on a five-point Likert scale to what extent these objectives had been attained in comparison with their expectations at the time when the programs were launched.
A total of 99 responses were received. This corresponds to a response rate of 45.8% as 216 projects had been approved by the time when the questionnaire was sent out. While we would have preferred a higher response rate, the number of responses was nevertheless high enough to warrant conclusions about objectives that were regarded as the most important ones, especially since the results of the questionnaire study were corroborated by the interviews. Figure 1 shows the participants' ratings for program level objectives. The most highly rated ones were concerned with the development of technological breakthroughs, increases in RTD volume, and the creation of new business areas. From the foresight perspective, it is noteworthy that the intelligence function (e.g., sharing information about technological progress) received high ratings, indicating that this managerial function was indeed viewed as crucial by the participants. Considerable importance was also attached to networking, as measured through the creation of new contacts and wellfunctioning consortia. Objectives related to networking -such as strengthening of collaborative activities and broadening of collaborative networks -were also highly rated, while less emphasis was placed on gaining improved access to market knowledge, for example.
A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 suggests that the expectations of the managerial function for intelligence were placed mostly on the activities at program level (e.g., expert panels, workshops), and less on the work that was conducted in the specific RTD projects. In particular, because projects managed by research and industrial organisations both attached relatively similar ratings to program level objectives, it seems that it is pertinent to manage both types of projects within the same program.
Implications for technology policy
Strategic flexibility
As we have illustrated, the strengthening of program intelligence through strategic flexibility has been a central design goal in the Finnish RTD programs. This kind of flexibility may be critical in research environments where there is significant possibility that the commercial potential of ongoing RTD efforts may change (e.g., due to competition between rival standards). In fact, some of our interviewees noted that they had not really profited from their participation in the RTD programs of the European Union, largely because the obligations of these programs had not allowed them to alter the direction of their work even though the initial research objectives were no longer valid.
Strategic flexibility seems to be best coupled with incremental innovation processes which are characterised by relatively short development times, low investments in a dedicated infrastructure, small project size, and frequent evaluations by other researchers and potential users; these characteristics help prevent over-investment in a limited range of expensive technologies that may be defeated later on (see, e.g., [43] ). Since many RTD developments in electronics and telecommunications are developed through such processes (e.g., new value-added services), the question therefore arises as to how strategic flexibility and the associated managerial functions might be best implemented.
Experiences from the two RTD programs suggest that the implementation of strategic flexibility is likely to benefit from the following:
1 The responsibilities for all the managerial functions (including intelligence and coordination; see Table 1 ) need to be clarified in terms of how the knowledge of external experts and other stakeholders is brought to bear on the shaping of the RTD program (e.g., preparation, approval, monitoring, and evaluation of projects). Otherwise, there is a possibility that the expert panels remain weakly committed to their task, or that unresolved apprehensions about the utilisation of foresight deliverables stand in the way of an open dialogue. In particular, incentives associated with embedded foresight need to be considered [44, 45] .
2 To the extent that embedded foresight is expected to deliver codified results, it is likely to benefit from methodological support which helps retain the outputorientation of foresight work and facilitates comparisons across different technological domains. Such support may be less important if embedded foresight has a strong process-orientation, whereby the close interaction between the stakeholders can be relied on as means of ensuring that the foresight objectives are attained.
The characteristics of incremental innovation processes and the attendant need for strategic flexibility suggest that the strengthening of the intelligence function may call for a relatively tight integration of technology assessment, technology foresight and program evaluation [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] . In the Finnish RTD programs, for example, the remit given to the expert panels was intended to forge links between foresighting and ongoing project monitoring (see Table 2 ). Furthermore, about 3% of all projects in the programs either analysed emerging technologies or sought to assess the uses and impacts of new technology. Thus, there was a deliberate move towards a more comprehensive program design with a greater range of intelligence activities [51] . An understanding of the processes subsumed by embedded foresight provides a rich picture of the ways in which the program participants engage in networking and information sharing. From the viewpoint of formative evaluation, this presents opportunities because these processes can be assessed early on at a stage when it is possible to adjust them to promote the attainment of program objectives. In contrast, the results of summative ex post evaluations often become available only when it is too late to influence the program [52] .
Embedded foresight and strategic planning
As a rule, Tekes' RTD programs have been quite responsive to the technological needs that the industry has articulated. One can argue that this approach is compatible with the resource-based view of strategy [53, 54] which suggests that competitive advantage is attained by establishing and building on core competencies; however, if companies neglect longer-term concerns in developing these competencies, they may become reluctant to participate in joint RTD efforts which are not seen to be of immediate relevance to their current technological competencies. At the level of RTD programs, this may translate into a reactive stance whereby the focus of publicly support research is shifted to low risk RTD activities with moderate potential only. Here, embedded foresight may serve as a tool which helps assess technologies, the industrial relevance of which has not been demonstrated yet.
An activity which seems to fit the mission of embedded foresight is that of encouraging research organisations to share their views on future technologies and, where appropriate, to present their strategic plans as well. This helps promote more holistic and long-term perspectives than what would be the case if the RTD activities were addressed on a case-by-base basis only. Furthermore, pitching alternative visions against each other promotes an ongoing dialogue and mutual critiquing, which is likely to lead to a deeper understanding of technological opportunities and support the attainment of well-founded conclusions. Such visions may also justify curiosity-oriented research even in the absence of immediate industrial interest, thus mitigating the possibility that contract research organisations become excessively dependent on the shifting perceptions of their industrial partners.
Differences between comprehensive and embedded foresight
As summarised in Table 4 , comprehensive foresight -as exemplified by large-scale national foresight exercises -and embedded foresight are likely to differ with regard to their objectives, methodology, and deliverables. Specifically, comprehensive foresight is more extensive in terms of its time horizons and coverage of issues which need to be considered in setting the long-term research agenda. The implementation of such an agenda calls for continuous collaboration and competition among the RTD organisations. In this setting, embedded foresight can be viewed as a tool which serves to develop structures, processes, and methods which support the execution of RTD efforts. It may refer to the results of comprehensive foresight exercises, but it is still dependent on the participants' local knowledge of opportunities and threats. Overall, one can argue that comprehensive foresight alone has limitations in informing public RTD decision making with regard to the full range of developments that are of interest. To some extent, this is because knowledge of future opportunities is based on tacit expertise [55, 56] -which can be communicated only imperfectly and at a high cost to other parties -so that even well-conducted foresight exercises with a broad scope may produce results that appear too 'shallow' to incite action. Also, the experts' extensive participation may involve considerable opportunity costs. Embedded foresight need not be preceded by comprehensive foresight, nor does it have to be bound by the results of such exercises; on the contrary, expert panels may be invited to appraise earlier results and to propose alternative viewpoints. This is a motivating factor as well, because it allows the experts to explore future perspectives in a setting where mutual critiquing and shared norms set limits to egotistic behaviour. Another justification for adopting a critical viewpoint is that consensus as such is not a guarantee of high quality RTD decision making, particularly in conditions of high uncertainty, where the promotion of variety is likely to be the more appropriate strategic posture. Indeed, consensus on research priorities entails risks which can be mitigated by promoting technological diversity, for instance, by allocating funds to the exploration of new and even peripheral technological frontiers. Here, a series of connected experiments or pre-studies -'a probe and learn process' -may help reduce technological uncertainties more than a set of uncoordinated activities.
As a corporate analogue, it is instructive to note that a request for information by a senior executive is likely to spur action that overrides daily routines. To some extent, embedded foresight can fulfil similar objectives in RTD programs, although there may be no equivalent structures of authority which would drive the prioritisation of information needs or ensure that these needs derive from considerations that extend beyond the proposing participant's immediate interests.
Limitations of embedded foresight
In this section, we address challenges in the implementation of embedded foresight and then consider the limitations which derive from the very concept of embedded foresight.
Organisational issues
Embedded foresight -when understood as a tool for strengthening the intelligence function in RTD programs -may call for changes in the relationships between the funding agencies, the recipients of RTD funding and the experts who are consulted to support resource allocation decisions. These changes are brought about by the replacement of a fixed program design -where the RTD priorities are set at the outset and retained for the entire program duration -by a more flexible and learning-oriented design where the priorities are continuously negotiated and revised, if necessary.
If the funding decisions have been taken by predominately by the funding agency, there is a possibility that embedded foresight is seen to lead to a reduction in its decision powers. To some extent, this is true because the agency will need to consult external experts while ensuring that these consultations do not lead to information leaks which would undermine the competitive position of the program participants. However, since the funding decisions should draw upon the best available expertise, embedded foresight can be viewed as a means of structuring the processes through which this influence is exerted (e.g., via quadrants two and three to quadrant four in the framework of Table 3 ). If these processes remain weakly explicated, the participants with well-established contacts will be in a position to promote their interests most (e.g., though lobbying). This appears unwarranted if RTD decision making is subjected to high demands on impartiality and legitimacy.
Since external experts will need to consider technologies from a broader national perspective than what is typical in most companies or research organisations, it may take some time before the full scope of their remit is realised. It is also crucial that the experts trust each other, and that they do not regard their position merely as that of protecting the interests of their host organisations, or that they at least recognise common interests that can be pursued in a collaborative fashion. This can be promoted through a proper panel design: for example, 'vertical' panels consisting of representatives of suppliers and customers may complement the traditional 'horizontal' panels which consist of technology experts from competing organisations.
Taken together, then, it appears that a key challenge in the implementation of embedded foresight is that of instituting sufficient empowerment and incentives while protecting the collaborative nature of the dialogue. Towards this end, the experts should not only be charged with the remit of producing vision statements, but they need to be informed as to how these statements will come to bear on subsequent RTD decision making. In the framework of Table 3 , this means that explicit attention should be paid to the links between the different quadrants.
Inherent limitations
Prospective analyses can be produced within the RTD programs only after the requisite management and administrative structures have been established. Yet, these structures and associated appointments have far-reaching consequences for how alternative technological topics will be viewed: for instance, in the electronics and telecommunications programs, the delineation of theme areas entailed far-reaching choices as to how the technologies in these areas could be structured. From the foresight perspective, a potential pitfall here is that the rationale for these choices may remain poorly recorded because the organisational responsibilities (e.g., steering groups) may not be fully established during the preparation of the RTD program.
If experts are eager to promote issues which derive from their immediate interests, later foresight activities may remain focused on the issues which were topical at the time when the RTD program was launched; this problem may be aggravated by delays caused by the appointment and activation of expert panels. To shorten the delay, the expert panels should be appointed during the earliest phases of program preparation. In the two RTD programs on electronics and telecommunication, potential problems caused by a lock-in on early issues was mitigated by rotating the position of the panel chairman.
The scope of foresight work in RTD programs is likely to be narrower than in large-scale foresight exercises. To some extent, the time horizons considered will be limited by what may be realistically accomplished during the program, while the technological positioning of the program places constraints on the topics that will be regarded as relevant. As a result, embedded foresight is less effective in transcending boundaries than more comprehensive exercises which promote multiple perspectives in the consideration of long-term issues. Thus, it is unrealistic to assume that the national foresight function could be devolved into RTD programs. Embedded foresight -in the sense that we have discussed it as an integrated management function in RTD programsshould therefore be viewed as a complement to and not as a substitute for more encompassing foresight activities.
On the other hand, this narrower scope may allow for greater detail and richer technological content, whereby embedded foresight may serve as a backdrop against which RTD efforts can be evaluated. In particular, the juxtaposition of ongoing RTD efforts with prospective technological developments is likely to strengthen the intelligence function and to help in the preparation of subsequent RTD programs as well.
Conclusion
Our analysis demonstrates that the evolution of Finnish technology programs has given rise to organisational structures and knowledge sharing practices which seek to ensure that perspectives about technological opportunities are fed into the shaping and implementation of program priorities. These practices have not emerged as an attempt to conduct 'foresight' as a separate activity; rather, they have been motivated by the desire to build up strategic flexibility which is crucial for RTD programs in rapidly changing fields such as electronics and telecommunications.
One implication of our analysis is that large-scale national foresight exerciseswhich are unlikely to be repeated more than every three or four years -may benefit from foresight processes which are embedded into RTD programs. At this locus, the foresight objectives would include:
1 the translation of results from national exercises into actions within the RTD programs 2 the continuous questioning of earlier foresight conclusions and, more generally 3 the proactive solicitation of suggestions for enhancing the innovation system and its knowledge sharing processes.
Because the successful implementation of embedded foresight calls for a stronger empowerment of RTD programs, it creates a need for a closer integration of technology foresight, technology assessment and program evaluation. On one hand, this is because the dynamics of technological change calls for continuous foresight processes which are authorised to commission technology assessment studies as required. On the other hand, embedded foresight supports other activities as well, such as ex post evaluations where RTD efforts are contrasted with the objectives defined through earlier foresight activities. Overall, then, it seems that developing RTD programs into integrated instruments of technology policy will entail a host of new challenges.
